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TODD vs. LEE.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.

.MIay 15, 1862.

TODD vs. LYDIA A. AND FRANCIS C. LEE.
WRIGHT

et als. vs.

THE SAME.

JUFFRAYS VS. THE SAME.
TAYLOR et al. vs. THE SAME.
FARIES vS. THE SAME.
1. The contracts of afeme covert, when necessary or convenient to"the proper use
and enjoyment of her separate estate by virtue of the enabling statutes (secs. 1,
2, and 3. R. S. Wis. 18581), are binding upon the estate at law. (Conway vs.
Smith, 13 Wis.)
2. All her other engagements stand as before, good only in equity. (The case of
Yale vs. Dederer, 22 N. Y. 450, considered and disapproved; s. c., 18 N. Y. 265,
approved.)
3. The change from an equitable to a legal estate, has not, with respect to her
general engagements, enlarged her powers or removed the disability of coverture,
but she remains as if still possessed of an estate in equity without restriction as
to the jus diponendi, capable of charging it with debts incurred for her own
benefit or the benefit of her estate, to its full extent, and such charge may be
enforced in a civil action under the Code of Procedure.
4. The action should be in rem not in personam, for she is incapable of charging
herselfyeronal4y either in equity or at law.
' CHAPTER XCV.
OF THE RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN.

SECTION 1. The real estate, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, of any
female now married, shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, but shall
be her sole and separate property, as if she were a single female.
SECTIoN 2. The real and personal property of any female who may hereafter
marry, and which she shall own at the time of marriage, and the rents, issues, and
profits thereof, shall not be subject to the disposal of her husband, nor be liable
for his debts, and shall continue her sole and separate property.
SEcTIoN 3. Any married female may receive by inheritance, or by gift, grant,
devise, or bequest, from any person other than her husband, and hold to her sole
and separate use, and convey and devise real and personal property, and any
interest or estate therein, and the rents, issues, and profits, in the same manner
and with like effect as if she were unmarried, and the same shall not be subject to
the disposal of her husband, nor be liable for his debts.
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5. Injunctions and receivers in such actions may be had to preserve the property
during the pendency of the suits, and to convert the property and satisfy the
debts, for want of other process, after judgment.
6. The husband is a proper party, but no personal demand can be made against
bim in such cases. At common law the personalty of the wife rests absolutely
in the husband, and although he may be liable for her debts upon the principles
of agency, yet, even under the Code of Procedure, to bind him or his property,
a separate action at law must be brought. This common law rule has no application in such cases in equity; and whether he is liable or not is a question of
fact for the jury.1
7. L., afeme covert, the owner of a separate estate under the enabling statute, with
her husband's permission, upon the faith and credit of her separate estate, purchased goods. and hired a store, and engaged in trade as if she were sole. She
failed to pay for the rent, and refused to pay for the goods, because of coverture.
In actions brought to charge the rent and price of the goods upon her separate
estate, and to apply the goods left to liquidate the claims in suit, Held, That as
it is an established rule in equity that a feme covert may, with her husband's
permission, given even after marriage, become a sole trader, and hold the profits
arising out of her business to her sole and separate use, so equity, in consideration of the benefit thus accruing to her separate property, will charge the debts
properly incurred in trade upon it, and apply both her separate property and
stock in trade to their payment, through a receiver.

These were actions under the Code of Procedure, brought to
charge the married woman defendant's 'separate property, held
under the enabling statute of 1850 (R. S. Wis. c. 95, secs. 1, 2,
and 3), with the payment of debts incurred by her in separate
trade, and to reach the capital invested in the business. They
were commenced before the County Court for Milwaukee county ;
the first three entitled suits were removed to the Circuit Court for
that county, where the orders granting injunctions and a receiver,
which had been obtained in the County Court, to restrain the
dissipation of the property and preserve it during the litigation;
were vacated. From the orders dissolving the injunctions and
vacating the order appointing the receiver, the plaintiffs appealed.
The last two entitled suits were sent to the Circuit Court for Dane
county, where, upon the hearing, they were dismissed, and judgments for costs given against the plaintiffs, from which they
appealed.
1 Ornardvs. Seaton, 39 Maine 119; Id. 125; .Burgrervs.White, 2

Bosw. Sup. Ct. 92.
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The questions involved were nearly iaentical in all the cases,
and are disposed of together.
BDy the Court. DIXON, C. J.-Before the case of Yale vs.
Dederer, 22 N. Y. 450, it was well settled in New York, if, in
fact, anything can ever be said to be settled in that state, that a
married woman having a separate estate might bind it by her
general engagements to pay debts contractedfor the benefit of such
estate, or on her own account, or for her benefit upon the credit of
it. Mfetho. -Epis. Church vs. Jaques, 3 Johns. Oh. 77; S. C., in
Court of Errors, 17 Johns. 548; North American *Coal Co. vs.
.Dyett, 7 Paige 9; S. C., in Court of Errors, 20 Wend. 570;
Gardner vs. Gardner, 7 Paige 112; S. C., in Court of Errors, 22
Wend. 526; Curtis vs. Engel, 2 Sanf. Ch. 287; Yale vs. Dederer,
18 N. Y. 265.
In England a broader doctrine prevails. It has been decided
that she may not only bind her separate property by a general
engagement, written or parol, for her own benefit, or that of her
estate (Hurray vs. Barlee, 3 Al. & K. 209; Owens vs. -Dickenson,
1 Cr. & Ph. 48), but that she can do so by the execution of a bond
as surety for her husband (2 Atk. 69 ; 1 Bro. C. C. 16): and for
a stranger even (15 Vesey 596).
In Kentucky her separate estate has been charged with the
payment of a note executed as surety for her son, and parol evidence of her declaration, made at the time of executing it, that
she would not pay it, and her separate property should not go for
that purpose, was excluded (7 B. Mon. 293).
The courts of New York, however, have held to a narrower rule,
and she has been restricted within the limits above stated.
The rule given by SPENCER, C. J., 17 Johns., and CowEx, J.,
in 20 Wend., is indeed somewhat less stringent, and accords more
nearly with the English decisions. SPENCER, C. J., says: -I am
entirely satisfied that the established rule in equity is, that when
afeme covert, having separate property, enters into an agreement,
and sufficiently indicates her intention to affect by it her separate
estate, when there is no fraud or unfair advantage taken of her, a
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Court of Equity will apply it to the satisfaction of such engagement. Judge COWEN states it thus: "When her separate estate
is completely distinct, and, as here, independent of her husband,
she seems to be regarded in equity as respects her power to dispose
of or charge it with debts, to all intents and purposes as a .feme
sole, except in so far as she may be expressly limited in her powers
by the instrument under which she takes her interest."
"The feme covert," says Chancellor WALWORTH, in North
American Coal Co. vs. Dyett, 7 Paige 9, "is as to her separate
estate considered afeme sole, and may, in person or by her legally
authorized agent, bind such separate estate with the payment of
debts contracted for the benefit 'of that estate, or for her own
benefit upon the credit-of the separate estate." And again, in
aardnervs. aardner: " So faf as that estate is concerned, she is
considered a feme sole; and the estate is answerable for money
borrowed by her or her trustee for the benefit of such estate,
although the husband is the lender."
In the same case, in 22 Wend., Judge COWEN uses these words:
,"If the wife holds an estate separate from and independent of her
husband, as she may do in equity, chancery considers her in
respect to her power over this estate a feme sole; and although she
is still incapable of charging herself at law, and equally incapable
in equity of charging herself personally with debts, yet I think the
better opinion is, that separate debts, contracted by her expressly
on her own account, shall in all cases be considered an appointment or appropriation for the benefit of the creditors as to so much
of her separate estate as is sufficibnt to pay the debt, if she be not
disabled to charge it by the terms of the donation." The ViceChancellor reports the rule in 2 Sandf. Ch., by saying that the
complainants, " in order to sustain their suit, must show that the
debt was contracted either for the benefit of her separate estate, or
for her own benefit upon the credit of the separateestate."
The rule as last laid down, is fully and'explicitly sanctioned by
tle two judges delivering opinions in Yale vs. .Dederer,18 N. Y.
The case there turned on the ground that the liability of a surety
is stricti juri, and equity will not grant relief where there is no
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obligation at law. _32's. Dederersigned the note as surety for her
husband. At law the note was void. She had executed no instrument creating a specific lien on her separate estate which would
have been legally binding in case she had been a feme sole. In
equity it was a mere general engagement, which could only be
enforced upon principles of exact justice, and because it was
against conscience for her to refuse payment. This. element was
entirely wanting. It was clearly not the case of a debt contracted
on her own account, for her own benefit, or for the benefit of her
estate. This is Judge COMSTOCK'S position. Judge HARRIs'S is
substantially the same, though he treats it more as a question of
evidence. He holds that the fact of her engaging generally in
conjunction with her husband to pay money, is not sufficient evidence of an intention to charge her separate estate, that the presumption is the debt is that of the husband, and unless the contrary
be shown the claim must be denied.
The contracts of a married woman, when necessary or convenient
to the proper use and enjoyment.of her separate estate, are binding
at law. Conway vs. Smith, 13 Wis.
All her other engagements stand as before the passage of the
statutes, good only in equity. The change from an equitable to
a legal estate has not, with respect to them, enlarged her powers
or removed the disability of coverture, but she remains as if still
possessed of an estate in equity, without restriction as to the power
of disposition. Idem Wooster vs. Northrups, 5 Wis. 245; Yale vs.
Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265.
The debts in question belong to the latter class. Within all the
authorities, the separate estate of a married woman will be charged
in equity with the payment of debts contracted for her benefit.
In this case we need not inqjuire further, for that the debts in
question were beneficial to Mrs. Lee will readily appear. With
the acknowledged consent and approbation of her husband, she
engaged in business as a sole trader, the profits to be appropriated
to her separate and exclusive use. She contracted these debts in
the prosecution of that business. It is an established rule in such
cases, that the earnings of a trade thus carried on will in equity
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be deemed her separate property, and that she will be protected
in its use as against her husband, though not his creditors. 2
Story's Eq. Juris., § 1387; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife (30
Law Lib.), 171-2; Slanning vs. Style, 3 P. Wins. 334; Megrathl
vs. Bobertson, I Dess. 445; Freeman vs. Orser, 5 Duer 476;
Burger vs. White, 2 Bosw. 92, 96, 99; 2 Ind. Eq. 553. See also
Gore vs. Knight, 2 Vernon 535; Gage vs. Lester, 2 Bro. Cases
Parl. 4. This is a sufficient consideration of benefit to charge her
property with the payment of debts incurred in the business. If
the agreement for a separate trade be by articles before marriage,
without trustees, or if after, and founded upon a valuable consideration, the income and profits will be supported for her separate
use against her husband and his creditors. But if after marriage
he merely permit her to conduct business on her separate account,
the earnings will be protected only as against him. Story's Eq.,
supra. In such cases a Court of Equity will make him a trustee
for her separate use, and compel him to account to her or her
creditors for the profits which may come to his hands. Roper on
Husband and Wife, supra. But while the beneficial interests of
the wife is thus recognised and enforced in equity, her condition
at law is very different. There the profits as well as the capital
employed are the husband's, there being no trustees, no obstacle
to interfere between the rule of law which vests in him all the
wife's personal property accruing to her during the marriage, and
her equitable title to it as her separate estate under the permission
of her husband. Roper, supra. And be is also, upon the ground
of his presumed auth6rity to her, bound by her transactions in the
trade, and responsible for the debts. Idem. This answers many
of the authorities cited by respondent's counsel, and shows them
inapplicable. They were cases at 'law in which property thus
employed was held liable to seizure and sale to satisfy the husband's debts. They prove nothing here; these are proceedings in
equity to charge the separate estate, on the faith of which the
credits were given; and if it is admitted that the goods when purchased might have been taken for.Mr. Lee's debts, that does not
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affect the decision. It was one of the hazards to be considered by
AJIrs. Lee before embarking in the enterprise.
The great length to which the common law goes in denying the
separate rights of the wife, is illustrated by the following cases:The property in wearing apparel, bought for herself, by a wife
living with her husband, out of money settled to her separate use
befor-e marriage, and paid to her by the trustees of the settlement,
vests by law in the husband, and it is liable to be taken in execution for his debts. Carne vs. Brice, 7 M. & W. 183.
A husband and wife separated by agreement (not under seal),
and at that time he agreed to allow her a certain sum weekly for
her support, which was paid; and she saved a portion of her allowance and invested it in stock, and disposed of the proceeds by way
of g(ft. Held, That the husband was entitled to recover back the
money so given in an action for money lent against the person who
received it. Messenger vs. Clarke, 5 Exchequer 388.
A married woman deposited with the defendant the savings of
certain rents of leasehold property, which had on her marriage
been conveyed by her, with the consent of her intended husband,
to trustees, upon trust to pay or permit her to receive the rents,
&c., to her sole and separate use. Held, That the trust being
discharged on the rents coming to the wife's hands, the trustee
ceased to have any interest in or control over them ; and that,
upon the wife's death, her husband was entitled to bring an action
in his own right to recover the money so deposited. Bird vs.
.Peagrum,76 E. C. L. 638.
How far the introduction of legal instead of equitable estates,
and the authority of the wife at law to hold and dispose of personal
property which comes to her as separate estate, may be considered
in equity as having relaxed this strict rule of the common law, so
as to enable that Court to protect her against the demands of the
husband's creditors in cases like these, where her separate legal
estate is absorbed in the trade, or whether they have affected it at
all, need not here be examined. No claim on the part of Mr. Lee's
creditors (if there be any) has been interposed, and it is now too
late for them to proceed. Nor need we inqhiire how far equity

-
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would interfere in behalf of her creditors against his, since the
former by superior diligence have acquired actual precedence.
The moral force of a rule which would assist them to the products
of a business, built up by their indulgence, would appear to be
almost irresistible.
Neither are we to investigate Mr. Lee's personal liability. No
demand for personal judgment is made against him. Nor does it
seem there could be. As a trustee in equity, he is a proper party,
but his personal liability, whatever it is, is legal, and must be
enforced at law. The husband is liable upon the contracts of the
wife only upon the principles of agency-that he has authorized
her either expressly or by implication to bind him-the general
rule being that she has no such power (1 Macqueen on Husband
and Wife 131 (57 Law Lib. 03); Freestone vs. Butcher, 9 C:& P.
643 (38 E. C. L. 269) ; Lane vs. Ironmonger, 13 M. & W. 368) ;
and whether she was authorized or not is a question of fact for the
jury. Idem. In determining it, many circumstances are to be
considered, as whether the contracts are extravagant (Lane vs. Ironmonger, supra), whether the husband having control of the goods
does not cause them to be returned (Waithorn vs. Wakefield, 1
Cowp. 120), and whether the credit was not given solely to the wife,
when it is said the husband will in no case be liable. Preestonevs.
.Butc er, supra; Bentley vs. Griffin, 5 Taunt. 356; 1 E. C. L.
131; Metcalf vs. Shaw, 3 Camp. 22. Mr. Roper thinks that
whenever the wife is to be considered as acting as a feme sole, and
entitled to the profits of her separate trade, as her sole and
separate estate, the husband will not be liable, in equity, to her
engagements contracted in it ; that the creditor cannot complain,
since he trusted to her credit only, and it would be unjust to subject him to her debts, when he is not entitled to any of the
profits; and that a Court of equity will interfere to prevent the
prosecution of the legal right, and at the same time subject the
funds in the trade to the demands of her creditors. 2 Roper 174.
But these positions are doubted by Mr. Jacob and Mr. Bright (2
Bright's Husband and Wife 301), and seem never to have been
adjudicated.
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The issuing of the injunctions and appointment of the receiver
in these cases, was under the circumstances undoubtedly correct.
They take the place of the process of attachment when necessary
and proper at law. Such was the practice under the former
system in equity, when there were no trustees of the separate
estate, and the fund was in danger of being wasted or put beyond
the reach of creditors. It was the course pursued. in Lilia vs.
Airey, I Vesey 277, and in Mth. -Epis. Church vs. Jaques, 1
Johns. Ch. 450. And instances of an injunction where there were
trustees are very numerous.
It follows from these views that orders dissolving the injunctions,
and vacating the orders appointing a receiver in the first three
entitled cases, and the judgments in the last two, must be reversed,
and that all must be remanded for further proceedings according
to law.
Orders and judgments reversed, and cases remanded.
We have, reluctantly, felt compelled to
omit that portion of the opinion of Mr. Ch.
J. Dxxozt, in which he gives avery elaborate and thorough review ofthe opinion of
the New York Court of Appeals, in Yale
vs. Dederer, 22 N. Y. R. 450. This we
have done on account of the very great
length to which the opinion would otherwise have extended. That portion of the
opinion, forming more than one-half of
the whole, not being essential to the authority of the case, although of maiked
interest and ability, we have therefore
omitted.
After so thorough a review of the cases
and so exhaustive a discussion of the
principles of equity, involved in the
question decided by this case, we should
not feel justified in occupying much
more space in regard to them. But some
few cases have been decided, later than
the published Reports, at the date of the
opinion in that case, to which it may be
of interest to refer. We have, through
the courtesy of the reporter, been per-

mitted to see the opinion of the Court,
in the case of Willard vs. Eastham, 15
Gray, soon to be published, wherein the
S. J. Court of Massachusetts held that
the promissory note of a married woman (having separate estate), given by
way of accommodation, as surety for
another, not her husband, will not bind
her separate estate, either the corpus of
the property or the rents, issues, and
profits, unless there is distinct evidence,
from the contract ftself, that such was
her intention, or that the contract was
upon the credit of such estate. The
Court here thus state the English law:
"The result of the English decisions
would therefore seem to be, that the separate estate of a married woman is answerable, for all her debts and engagements, to the full extent to which it is
subject to her own disposal." And this
seems to us to be a very accurate statement, in all respects, so far as that point
is concerned. For, upon examination
of the English cases upon this question,
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and they are quite numerous, it will be
perceived, that a large number of them
turn upon the point, how far the property was under the disosal of the feme
covert.
The leading American case of The
Methodist Episcopal.Church vs. Jaques,
8 Johns. Ch. R. 77-121, where Chancellor KENT occupied so much space in
reviewing and criticising the English
cases, turns entirely upon the point,
whether, by the deed of settlement, the
married woman had the power to charge
her separate estate, by all her engagemeats, in whatever form. And all the
discussion in the English cases upon the
question how far the contract is a good
execution of the power of the wife over
her separate property, according to the
fair construction of the terms of the settlement, turns upon the same point:
which we shall see is finally abandoned
by the English Courts as untenable.
This question has been made the turning point in a very large proportion of
the English cases. For the relatives and
friends of married women, in attempting
to make provision for their support, in;
4ependently of the husband's resources,
after the Equity Courts had determined
that they had the same general power
over their separate property, as femes
sole, found it indispensable, in order to
relieve wives from the power and importunity 9f husbands, to fetter the disposition of the wife's property with every
clQg and embarrassment, which would
still leave it available for their own
maintenance. Such a clause is often
inserted to prevent the wife anticipating,
or alienating, the income of her separate
property. This was said to have been
first done by the advice of Lord TuunLow, who was one of the trustees, in the
case of Miss Walton. See Pybus vs. Smith,
8 Br. C. C. 347; Parkesvs.White, 11 Vesey
221 ; Jacksonvs.Hobhouse, 2 Mer. R. 487;

Lord COTTE.HAS,

Chancellor, in Rennie

vs. Ritchie, 12 C. & F. 234. We are not
aware that any well considered case has
ever attempted to evade any restrictions
upon alienation inserted in the deed of
settlement. It is certain no such course
of decision could bejustified. It is clear,
however, that this point is not the one
upon which this case turns.
For it is obvious, that where Equity
holds married women as having the same
general power of disposing of their separate estate, as if they were sole, it is
not easy to comprehend the ground upon
which any distinction can be made, in
principle, between debts evidenced by
an express undertaking to charge the
separate property, and those which are
not; or between debts of suretyship and
those where the consideration goes to
the feme covert, or for the benefit of her
separate estate, so far as her intention to
charge her separate estate is concerned. If
the promissor have no means of meeting
an undertaking, except her separate estate, and could not bind herself personally, the conclusion seems irresistible, that
if she contracts in good faith, she does
intend to bind her separate property.
It seems to us, therefore, that the American cases, among which we may name
Yale vs. Dederer, 18 N. Y. Court of Appeals R. 205, S. C. 22 Id. 450, Willard
vs. Eastham, 8u~pra, and many others,
referred to in 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 427,
Hare & Wallace's Am. Note, which have
held that the promissory note of a married woman, for the .accommodation of
one not her husband, will not, primafacie, bind her separate estate, in equity;
but that such contract will so bind her
separate estate, if it appear, as some of the
cases hold, from the contract itself, and
as others hold, either from the contract
or aliunde, that such was her intention,
at the time of entering into the contract,
do not rest upon any satisfactory prin-
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ciple. We can comprehend the import,
and the reasonableness, of such a rule
when it is made universal, as a restriction upon the power of married women
in regard to the disposition of their separate estates. We would not dissent
from a legislative restriction, prohibiting
married women from binding themselves
(as they are now allowed to do, personally, in many of the states, as to contracts generally), or their separate property, for any contract of suretyship.
Such a restriction, as to the husband,
would certainly be judicious. It may be
questionable whether the Courts could,
with much show of reason, now adopt
such a rule, but the legislature might
do it. But the American Courts, in attempting to discriminate between the
presumption of intention to charge the
separate estate, where the contract is
one of suretyship, and where it is one
for the benefit of the frme, or of her separate estate, and holding that such
presumjtion will not arise from the contract itself, in the former case, but that
it will, in the latter, seem to us, to have
manifested more sense of justice and indulgence towards the interest of the
feme, than of tenderness in regard to
the implications affecting her good faith,
growing out of the reasons which they
urge for the distinction. For it seems
to be difficult to raise any distinction in
regard to her intention to charge her
separate estate, which will not finally implicate her in positive bad faith towards
the person with whom she was contracting.
And the Court, in Willard vs. Eastham, feeling the force of this implication doubtless, has placed the case upon
the ground that a contract of suretyship,
being, prima facie, neither for the benefit of the feme, or her estate, cannot be
made a charge upon her separate estate,
unless by her express contract. And

where the contract is in writing, this
provision must form part of the writing,
of course. This makes the decision more
consistent with reason andwith fact than
those are, where a distinction is attempted to be made between the presumption
of intention on her part in regard to
charging her separate estate, when the
contract is for her own.benefit, or that
of her estate, and when it is not.
It would be quite impossible to give
any intelligible view of the American
law upon this question, within any such
limits as are allowed us here. It has
seemed to us, that in those particulars in which the American Courts
have departed from the rules of equity
recognised in the English Courts, it has
rather tended to make the law convenient and agreeable, than rational or
consistent in itself.
1. The American Courts have required
that in the deed or conveyance of the
estate to the separate use of a married
woman, it should expressly appear that
she had power to charge the same by a
given form of contract, in order to make
.such contract a charge upon such estate.
Ewing vs. Smith, 3 Dessaus. 417; Trustees of Frazier vs. Center, 1 McCord's
Ch. R. 270; Magwood vs. Johnson, 1
Hill C. R. 228; Robinson vs. Ex'ors of
Dart, Dudley's Eq. 128; Reid vs. Lamar,
1 Strobh. Eq. R. 27.
In New York, Chancellor KENT condemned the English rule; Meth. Episc.
Ch. vs. Jaques, supra; but hib decision
was reversed, 17 Johns. R. 548; and the
New York Courts, through a long course
of years, were understood to have recognised fully the English rule upon this
point: That, where no restriction was
placed upon the power of alienation, the
Courts would not create any by implicacation. But that ground is certainly
very essentially shaken in the opinion
of lMr. Justice SELDEN, in Yale vs. Dede-
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ver, 22 N. Y. Rep. 450. And the Courts
in Pennsylvania seem to have adopted
somewhat similar grounds. All this certainly shows very manifest dissatisfaction
with the English rule, and an increasing
disposition to protect the property of
married women. Andas married women
have no power, by the common law, to
make a contract personally binding, and
it is only through the aid of Courts of
Equity that such contracts can be made
a charge upon their separate estate, it is
to be expected that those Courts would
affix such conditions to the relief granted, as they deemed requisite for the protection of the rights of those who are
under their protection, in some sense.
We only regret that there should be so
much conflict between the English and
Americau cases upon this point, when
there seems so slight ground for departig'from the English rule, as at present
held.
2. This whole idea of regarding the
estate of the wife in her separate property, as in the nature of a trust for her
support, and that she can only charge
it by virtue of a power given her for"
that purpose, which has led 'to so much
discussion and confusion, both in England and this country, is a mere fietion,
and as such has been formally and entirely abandoned in England within the
last year. Johnson vs. Gallagher, 7
London Jur. N. S. 273 (March 1861).
Lord Justice TuRNER there said, "The
doctrine of appointment, however, seems
to me to be exploded by Owens vs.
Dickinson, 1 Cr. & Ph. 48. A Court of
Equity having created the separate estate, has enabled a married woman to
contract debts in respect of it. .Her perspn cannot be made liable either at law
or in equity, but in equity her property
may. This Court, therefore, as I conchive; gives execution against the -property, just as a Court of law gives exe-

cution against the property of other
debtors." * * "The evidence, I think,
shows that the tradesmen who supplied
the goods supposed and believed that
she had separate estate, and dealt with
her on that assumption. So far, therefore, as they were concerned, they dealt
on the footing of a separate estate. How
was it, then, on the part of the defendant? She was, as I have said, living
-separate from her husband, and had separate estate; and I think that when,
under such circumstances, a married
woman contracts debts, the Court is
bound to impute to her the intention to
deal with *her separate property, unless
the contrary is clearly proved. The
Court cannot impute to her the dishonesty of not intending to pay for the goods
which he purchased."
This view of.the law is -given by one
of the ablest and most experienced equity judges now living, and upon a full
review of all the English cases, and we
must confess that it seems to us to have
stripped the matter of much of its former
complication and confusion, and to be
far more satisfactory than any other
view which we have yet seen. It would
undotbtedly render the separate estate
of a married woman liable upon her contracts of suretyship. And it is very
obvious, that if she is hd capable of
assuming such obligations, in any form,
'so a's
torbecome a charge upon her stparate estate, it is but an arbitrary requirefhetkt that the written contract; which by
the Statute of Frauds is required to be
in writing in order to bind her for the
"debt of another," should go beyond
the statute, and b~yond the requirements of any -positive law, and contain an express stipulation to the effect
that she intends to bind her separate
estate. This certainly looks like an
invention to render the contract inoperative, and might lead simple-minded
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suitors to suspect that, when that requirement is met, some other will be
made. We suggest again the more satisfactory course of saying, at once,
that Courts of Equity will not lend their
aid to enforce a contract of suretyship

Supreme

against the separate estate of a married
woman, in whatever form it may be
made, or else of allowing such contratts
of married women to stand upon the
same general footing with their other
L F. R.
contracts.

Court of Indiana.

JOHN REYNOLDS VS. THE BANK OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.
By the charter of the Bank of the State of Indiana, it was provided, that the bank
should not at any time suspend or refuse payment in gold or silver, of any of its
notes, bills, or obligations, &c., and that if it should neglect or refuse to do so,
then the holder should be entitled to recover the amount with twelve per cent.
interest. On the 1st of April 1862, the plaintiff demanded of a branch bank
payment of its notes in coin, which was refused, but the amount tendered in
United States legal tender Treasury Notes.
Held, (1st,) That the provision in the charter in question, did not amount to a
restriction of the right of the bank to avail itself of the privilege of using
anything else as money, as a tender, which the United States, by their laws,
might legally declare to be such.
(2d), That Congress had not the Constitutfonal power to declare paper money a
legal tender; but
(3d), That, considering that the Legislature and Executive Departments of the
Federal Government had decided in favor of the existence of such a power, and
what the consequences of an opposite decision at the present time by the court
would be, they would hold the Treasury Notes to be a legal -tender until the
Federal Courts should determine otherwise.

Appeal from the St. Joseph's Circuit Court.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-On the first day of April, 1862, John Reynolds
presented to the Branch at South Bend of the Bank of the State
of Indiana, certain notes or bills issued by 'that Branch in the
exercise of power conferred by the charter of the Bank, and,
within the usual banking hours, denianded their redemption in
coin. The Branch refused to redeem-the notes in coin, but offered
to redeem them in treasury notes, issued under late acts of Congress, and declared by act of Congress to be a legal tender. These
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treasury notes, issued as they are upon no specie basis, but simply
upOn the indebtedness and credit of the government, and designed
to circulate as money, fill the definition of bills of credit. The
Circuit Court decided against the plaintiff, holding that the Bank
might redeem in treasury notes. The charter of the Bank contains this section':" Sect. 8. The said bank shall not at ;ny time suspend or refuse
payment in gold or silver, of any of its notes, bills, or obligations, due or payable, nor of any moneys received upon deposit;
and if said bank at any time refuse or neglect to pay any bill,
note, or obligation issued by such bank, if demanded within the
usual banking hours, at the proper branch where the same is payable, according to the contract, promise, or undertaking therein
expressed, or shall neglect or refuse to pay on demand as aforesaid any moneys received on deposit to the person or persons entitled to receive the same, then, and in every such case, the holder
of any such bill, note, or obligation, or the person or persons
entitled to demand or receive such moneys as aforesaid, shall
respectively be entitled to receive and recover interest on their
said demands, until the same shall be fully paid and satisfied, at
the rate of twelve per centum per annum, from the time of such
demand as aforesaid, and any branch so failing to meet its engagements may be closed as in case of insolvency."
In the present condition of the country, if the Bank proceeds
under this section of the charter to redeem her circulation in coin,
she will probably destroy herself, ruin a large portion of her debtors, and distress the people; while, on the other hand, if she is
legally bound thus to proceed, and does not, she will thereby also
put her own existence in jeopardy.
In this dilemma the Bank asks for a speedy decision of the
pending cause, and the plaintiff joins in the request.
, The Constitution of the United States, Art. 1, sect. 10, ordains
that no State shall - coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything
but gold and silver coin a legal tender," &c. Indiana, in loyal
submission to this limitation upon her power as a sovereign State,
in, framing her Constitution, provided3 Art. 10, sect. 7, that "all
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bills or notes issued as money shall be, at all times, redeemable in
gold or silver" : and as we have seen, !he legislature in chartering
the Bank of the State of Indiana., an institution created to _ssue
a circulating medium of paper, required of her a compliance with
this constitutional provision.-Sect. 8, above quoted. •From such
compliance the State cannot release the Bank. Can the United
States do so'? is the question. If the United States, under the
Constitution, can make treasury notes a legal tender in payment
of debts between. citizen and citizen, she can make them thus
between the States of the Union, corporations and citizens. And
coming now to the particular case before us, as the section in the
charter of the Bank of the State above quoted, was inserted to make
it conform to the restriction upon the power of the State, imposed
by the Constitution of the United States, viz., that a state shall
not create money, in the constitutional sense of that word, and
shall not by her own laws recognise anything as such but gold and
silver, it is not reasonable that we should construe that section as
a restriction upon the right of the Bank to avail herself of the
privilege of using anything else as money, as a legal tender, which
the United States, by her laws, might legally declare to be such. The
true interpretation of the section must be, that the Bank shall not
refuse to redeem her bills in what the Congress shall constitutionally make legal tender money. The Bank cannot be compelled to
receive treasury notes from the citizen in one hand, and pay to the
citizen gold and silver with the other. Under this construction
of the charter, the Act of Congress in question does not impair
its obligation, regarded as a contract. But it may be remarked,
if Congress can impair the obligation of contracts, in this particular, between citizens, it can also between citizens and corporations,
and the States and corporations. The decision of the cause, then,
must turn upon the question, Can Congress make treasury notes
a legal tender? Can it make anything but gold and silver coin a
legal tender? The answer to this questibn must be drawn from
the Constitution of the United States, for it is a judicially established proposition that Congress can exercise such powers only as
are granted expressly or incidentally by that instrument. And
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the same rule applies to every other department of the Government. It may be further 'observed that, if the proposition just
stated is not true in every particular, then is our Government
practically one of unlimitied powers, and the Constitution a delusive bauble,
We proceed to investigate the questions above propounded.
I. The power to make treasury notes or anything else but coin,
a legal tender, is not expressly given in the Constitution. The
money-making power is granted to Congress in these words:
-Congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coin."
II. Is such power granted as an incident to any substantive
power? Thiat it is not, the following considerations strongly tend
to prove, viz.:
1. The convention which adopted the Constitution not only did
not grant, bui they expressly rejected it, as a substantive power,
and for the distinctly declared purpose of preventing its exercise
by Congress, under any pretext or circumstances whatever-and
this too after the power had once been expressly granted to the
Federal. Government; and the states subsequently ratified the
Constitution with this understanding. Articles of Confederation,
§ 5; Elliott's Debates, vol* 1, pp. 258, 276, 418, and 531; Madi,
son Papers, vol. 2,. p. 1232; 8 Id. 1843 et seq.; 2 Story on the
Const. 2 Ed., commencing at section 1358; Curtis's Hist. Const.
vol. .2, pp. 328, 329, 364. The above proposition is established by
the debates in the convention: See Madison.Papers, supra,by the
communications of members to their respective states: See Elliott's
Deb., supra; and by the fact that members of the convention were
members of the state ratification conventions.
2. Such paper isunequal to the functions of a national currency.
It is claimed that the power to emit bills is an .incident to that of
reguilating. commerce-that a medium of exchange, a currency, is
a necessity of .cop.ierce, Lnd its creation an incident in the regu,
lation of commerce. This argument is not as satisfactory as could
be wished. It has apparent weaknesses.
1. As matter of fact, the bills are not emitted on account of
commerce. Commerce does not apply for their issue.
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2. They are not needed for domestic commerce; for foreign
they are useless.
3. It is admitted that currency, as a medium of exchange, is a
great necessity of commerce; and it is an acknowledged power of
every government to ordain what shall constitute that currency,.
Governments have done so; but, throughout the civilized wo~ld,
they have all concurred in declaring that gold and silver shall be
that currency. Why they have so declared will be seen as we
advance. Now, the precise question of what should be the, euru
rency of this nation, what should be its medium of commerce, what
should be used to meet that necessity, was the one that was before
the convention which constructed the frame of our governme'it;
and they ordained and established, by the paramount, the fundamental law of the nation, that that currency should be gold and
silver, or paper issued upon and as the representative of gold and
silver, and not bills of credit- issued simply upon theindebtedness
and faith of the government. Hence, it would seem that there
could be no incidental power over this question, connected with
the regulation of commerce.
And here the question occurs, Why was it ordained by our Constitution that coin should constitute the currency of this nation.?
As we have seen, currency is the medium of commerce, is created
for commerce; and it is a necessity that .it should consist of something that will circulate co-extensively with commerce; but commerce is not limited by geographic lines; its domain is the world;
the republic of commerce is as expanded as the globe. Hence; to
be equal to the exigencies of the subject, the currency must consist of that which will circulate with equal 'credit all over the
globe: something that possesses an intrinsic value, a value not
dependent upon the duratiri or condition of governments; that
revolutions and changes in political organizations will not affect;
for commerce looks not to, and does no- depend upon, the forms
of such organizations. The gold and silver in the rebel republic
to-day is as good, the world over, as. is that of the old legitimatb
republic, while its bills of credit are becoming as worthless' as
withered leaves. Such a currency, the experience of the world
VOL. 10.-43
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proves, paper cannot be. Said Mr. Webster, in his speech on the
currency, in 1837, c I am for a sound currency for the country,
and by this I mean a convertible currency, so far as it consists of
paper. Mere government paper, not payable otherwise than by
being received for taxes, has no pretence to be called a currency,
After all that can be said about it, such paper is mere paper money.
It is nothing but bills of credit. It always has been and always
will be, depreciated. Sir, we want specie, and we want paper of
universal credit, ald which is convertible into specie at the will of
the holder. That system of currency, the experience of the world,
and our own experience, have both fully approved."
Says Mr. Crawford, in his report, in 1820: -By the term
'currency,' the issue of paper by government, as a financial resource, is excluded." Funding Systems, p. 743.
But while bills of credit will not furnish a sound currency themselves, they tend to exclude such a currency, viz., coin, from circulation, and to drive it from the country. As such paper will 'not
circulate in foreign countries, the importer, when he has received
his balances here in that medium, is compelled to go to the banks
and brokers and exchange it for coin, which he takes abroad with
him; and, at present, as our main producm-exports are cut off, their
place must be supplied by specie; and, as the banks are not required to retain specie for the redemption of their own paper, if
the bills of credit are a legal tender, they can, and it is to be
feared many of them will, dispose of their entire stock, as it will
command a premium over paper, and, ere long, tfiis country be left
with nothing but a pure p per medium, without the basis of a
dollar of specie. To illustrate :--The great bulk of our produceexports, in years past, has consisted of cotton, tobacco, and rice.
The report of the Secretary of the Treasury for 1861, shows that
the value of cotton, rice, and tobacco exported in that year, exceeded two hundred and ten millions of dollars. We are now
deprived of these articles of export, and the vacuum must be
filled by coin, or commerce be in proportion diminished. So, the
interest on our vast bond-indebtedness to foreigners must be paid
in specie.
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The cotton crop of last year, it would seem, is to be burned,'
and it is scarcely possible that a crop should be raised this year(the loss of two cotton crops, in times of peace, would revolutionize the commercial and financial world)-and thus it would
seem to be inevitable that a foreign demand will exist that must
drain the entire specie from the country, as the counter home
demand for it is removed by the bills of credit, if they are a legal
tender; and when it is all exhausted what will be done then?
These considerations were vividly in the minds of the Convention that formed, and of the States that adopted our present
Constitution. They had before them the then recent history of
the issue of continental and state bills of credit, and the disastrous results thereof to the country, and they determined to
prevent a repetition of the evils. See the subject most thoroughly
discussed in 2 Story on the Constitution, 2d edition, commencing
at section 1358.
On the other hand, the legislative and executive departments
of the Federal Government have, within the "past year, for the first
time in the history of the Government, it is true, decided in favor
of such a power, and have exercised it; and the disastrous consequences to the country that must follow a denial of the validity
of that exercise of power, press hardly upon the judiciary to
sustain the violation of the Constitution, if it be such, anid thus
create a precedent for further usurpations. But with the tribunal
of last resort, such considerations should not have influence. The
preservation of the Constitution, in its letter and spirit, should be
an object outweighing, with that tribunal, ull considerations of
temporary inconvenience. That such would be the course of this
Court, on a question arising under our state constitution, we think
its past action will amply sustain us in asserting. In the case at bar,
our decision is but that of a Nlisi Prius Court, and we had better
err in acquiescing in, than by declaring null the action of Congress.
Influenced, then, by deference to the action of the Federal
Government, by the rule that all doubts must be resolved in favor
of the law (a principle that tends constantly to augment the powers
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of limited governments); by the exigencies of the times; by the
consideration of the local injury, temporarily, to our State that
would follow a different decision, and the fact that the question
can only be decided finally by the Supreme Court of the United
States, we hold that the Act of Congress, making treasury notes
a legal tender, is within the Constitution and valid. Such will be
the ruling of this Court, till the Federal Court shall determine
the question otherwise. The Bank, by redeeming in treasury
notes, does not expose her franchises to forfeiture. The judgment
below is affirmed with costs.
It is therefore considered by the Court that the judgment of the Court below, in the above entitled cause,
be in all things affirmed, at the costs of the appellant;
all of which is ordered to be certified to said Court.
And it is further considered by the Court, that the
, for
appellee recover of the appellant the sum of
her costs and charges in this behalf expended.

Superior Court of the City of .New York.
CHARLES B.

May, 1862.

HOFFMAN et al. V8. DANIEL MILLER et

al.

]I., C. & 1I., of Baltimore, indorsed in blank and deposited for collection with
J. L. & Co., bankers and collecting agents in the same city, a bill payable in
New York. The latter indorsed for collection to the plaintiffs, also bankers and
collection agents doing business in New York. Each of these two houses was
constantly remitting paper to the other for collection, and knew that each remitted paper for collection belonging to third persons. The remitted paper,
-when payable at sight, was collected, and then credited as cash. That payable
in futuro was entered in the books of the house receiving it, as received for
collection, and was not otherwise credited, unless, nor until it was actually paid.
According to the course of business, each house drew for the cash balance in its
favor, arising from actual collections, and not against paper remitted and not
matured. There was no express agreement between them, that either should
hold the paper it held running to maturity, as security for the paper remitted to
the other for collection, or for cash balances. J. L. & Co., at the time of remitting the bill in question to the plaintiffs, owed them a small cash balance, and
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immediately thereafter received from the plaintiffs other remittances, which
they collected, but failed to pay over, and failed in business before the bill in
question matured. The plaintiffs were immediately notified that the bill belonged
to M., C. & M., but on demand thereof refused to surrender it.
Held, That the plaintiffs could not retain the bill as against H., C. i ff., as indemnity against the balance owing to them by . L. 1. Co., and that they were not
bond fide holders for value in such sense as to have acquired a title superior to
that of M., C. & M.
H dh also, That evidence by the plaintiffs, that in making the remittances, made
after receiving the bill in question, they looked to, and relied on, the unmatured
paper in their hands, received from J. L. & Co., was not entitled to any consideration, as neither any agreement nor the course of dealing between them and
J. L. & Co., authorized them to so rely, and J.L. & Co. had no reason to suspect
that any remittance made to them was influenced by any such consideration.

Appeal by the defendants from a judgment. This suit, when
commenced, was brought against Allan Hay &. Co., as acceptors
of a bill of" exchange, dated -Houston, Texas, September 22,
1860," drawn by John Dickinson on Allan Bay & Co., of New
York, for $1100, payable thirty days after sight to the order of
Miller, Cloud J-Miller; and "accepted October 5, 1860, payable
at the Bank of Commerce, in New York." When received by
the plaintiffs it was indorsed thus :-,Miller, Cloud &' Miller;"
,,Pay Messrs. Hoffman & Co., or order, for collection, JOSIAH
LEE & CO., eleven hundred dollars."
Allan Hay & Co. having
no defence, except that they were ignorant to whom the bill should
be paid (the plaintiffs and Miller, Cloud & Miller severally claiming to own it), were permitted, by an order in the action, to pay
the money into Court, and Miller, Cloud &,Miller were made
defendants in their stead. The question now is, does the money
belong to the plaintiffs, or to the substituted defendants Miller,
Cloud & Miller?
The plaintiffs' firm, at and prior to receiving the bill, were
bankers and collecting agents, doing business in the city of New
York; and the firm of JosiahLee & Co. were also bankers and
collecting agents, doing business in the city of Baltimore.
Miller, Cloud & Miller, on the 20th of October, 1860, doing
business in Baltiniore, and then owning the bil in question, deposited it with Josiah Lee & Co. for collection, at the saipe time
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indorsing it, in blank, as before stated. On the 23d of October,
1860, Josiah Lee & Co., after indorsing it in the form mentioned,
enclosed that and another bill for $77.81, in a letter of that date,
directed to the plaintiffs, and reading thus:" MESSRS. HUFoMAN & Co.: Dear Sirs :-We enclose for cWllection and credit, bills stated below. Respectfully, yours,
JOSIAH LEE & Co.
D. S. Cohen
Allan Hay & Co.

$77.31
. 1100.00"
.

..

The plaintiffs, by letter dated October 24, 1860, replied (inter
alia) as follows:& Co., Baltimore.
Dear Sirs :-We have received your favor of 23d instant, with
enclosures as stated.
$77.31 to your credit, and
1100.00 acceptance, Allan Hay & Co., due November 4-7, 1860,
which we enter for collection."
"MESSRS.

JOSIAu LEE

Charles B. Iloffman, one of the plaintiffs, and the only witness
on their part, testified thus :-" There were two accounts in the
books of each; we kept an account of all paper sent to them
(Josiah Lee & Co.), and it was called ' our account,' and drafts
drawn against it were entered in that account. All paper received
from them, and drafts against us, constituted the other account,
which was called their ' account.'
Q. Was the acceptance in suit ever passed to the credit of
Josiah Lee & Co. upon your books?
A. No, sir; it was never passed upon the ledger; a memorandum of it was kept on the blotter and another small book. It was
not our custom to pass paper to the credit of the remitting firm,
in those accounts, until the paper matured and was paid, when we
passed them on the ledger. Of the two acceptances mentioned in
the letter of October 23d, one was paid on sight, and immediately
passed to the credit of Josiah Lee & Co.; the other, being the
acceptance in suit, was treated differently.
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[The entry in plaintiffs' blotter was thus:"851.
October 24, 1860.
"JosAHE LEE & Co., Baltimore, (Their account.)

"Their remittance on D. P. Cohen
"Allan

Hay & Co.

.

.

.

.

.

.

$77.81
-$77.31
$1100"]

Q. Did you ever draw against any particular remittance, payable in future?

A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever consider yourself entitled to diaw as against
remittances for collection prior to their maturity ?
A. The question never came up.
Q. Did you ever do it?
A. No, sir; we never had occasion to do it.
Q. You did, at this time, a general collection business for account of customers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Any one that chose to deposit paper with you for collection,
you forwarded it for collection?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was not that the general business of Josiah Lee & Co.?
A. Yes, sir; that was one branch; they were in the habit of
receiving paper from other parties and transmitting it for collection.
Q. Was there any express and positive agreement between
Josiah Lee & Co., in reference to this acceptance, except by the
letter and order given in evidence?
A. No, sir, there was not."
Josiah Lee & Co. failed November 1, 1860, and on the 2d of
that month delivered to defendants a written order on the plaintiffs,
requiring them to deliver to the defendants the acceptance in
question, the order stating, "they (the defendants) being the
rightful owners of the same, and we being agents to collect."
This order was presented to the plaintiffs, and the acceptance
demanded of them before this suit was brought, and they refused
to deliver it to the defendants.
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The plaintiffs received the acceptance on the morning
of the 24th of October. On the 23d there was a
balance due to them from Josiah Lee & Co. of .

.

$540.28

October 24, plaintiffs paid A. M. Allen on Josiah Lee
& Co.'s letter of credit

200.00

October 24, plaintiffs remitted to Josiah Lee & Co. for
collection
.
October 30, they also remitted to Josiah Lee & Co., for
collection, a draft for
They drew on Lee & Co., October 29, for
and October 30, -

.

.

.

.

.
.

438.57
3000.00
600.00
3000.00

These drafts were protested; Lee & Co. collected the remittances
of October 29th and 30th, and used the proceeds. They now owe
the plaintiffs $3901.53, excluding from the calculation the acceptance in question. Charles B. Roffman was allowed, against the
objection and exception of the defendants, to testify, that for
several months "we always took into account the paper that we
had on hand, in remitting for collection, or drawing down our
balances with them."
The judge, before whom the action was tried, found as facts
(among others) that the paper, remitted by the one firm to the
other, "always appeared to be the property of the party transmitting the same; each treated the paper so received from the other
as the property of the party from whom it was received, * * the
plaintiffs, until the 2d of November, 1860, had no notice that said
acceptance belonged to any person other than Josiah Lee & Co.,
and relying upon the possession of said acceptance, and other
securities, amounting to 8467.50," they paid the $200 October 24th,
and made the remittances of $438.67, and 83000,-,,and from
October 24th to October 29th, left the balance in plaintiffs' favor,
arising from the collection of such drafts, and otherwise, in the
hands of Josiah Lee & Co., undrawn for." He held as matters of
law, that the plaintiffs, as bankers, have a lien on the bill in question, for the balance due them from Josiah Lee & Co.; and that
they have acquired a valid title to the said bill of exchange as
bond fide holders thereof for value; and gave judgment for the
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plaintiffs for the amount of the bill, with interest, and ordered that
the money paid into court by the acceptors, be -applied on said
judgment. The defendants excepted to these decisions; and appealed from the judgment to the General Term.
L. B. Woodruff & C. F. Sanford, for appellants..
Win

. Russell & 61. Spring, Jr., for respondents;

By the Court. BOSWORTH, C. J.-On the facts, which the evidence will justify a jury or judge in finding, we think no discrimination favorable to the plaintiffs, can be made between this case
and Warner vs. Lee, 2 Seld. 144, and Scott vs. The Ocean Bank,
5 Bosw. 192, and 23 N. Y. R. 289.
In Warner vs. Lee, John T. Smith & Co., with whom the plaintiffs had deposited for collection a note owned by them, made by
Osborn & Whallon, sent it in a letter to the defendant, a banker,
which letter stated that it was cc enclosed for collection." In the
present case, the indorsement to the plaintiffs stated that it was
-for collection." The letter enclosing it (and another draft) stated
that they were enclosed ",for collection and credit." This, in the
light of the evidence given, means that the draft for $77.31 was
enclosed to be credited to Josiah Lee & Co., and the one for $1100,
for collection. The small one was paid at sight, and was credited
to Josiah Lee & Co. The large one-the one in question-was
entered on the plaintiffs' blotter, as received for collection, and was
never otherwise credited to Josiah Lee & Co.
In Warner vs. Lee, the plaintiffs had received no advances from
John T. Smith & Co. The present defendants received none from
Josiah Lee & Co.
In Warner vs. Lee, Smith & Co. were largely engaged in making
collections of notes for merchants in New York, and the defendant
was aware of that fact. In the present case, Lee & Co. " were in
the habit of receiving paper from other parties, and transmitting
it for collection." One of the plaintiffs so testifies, and of course
he was aware of that fact.
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In each case the accruing balances were collected in a similar
imapner.
.,In Warner vs.-Lee, the refereQ did not find that any advances
were made by defendant to John T. Smith & Co., on the credit of
the note there in question. In the present case, the judge has
found that the plaintiffs made advances to Josiah Lee & Co., on the
credit of the acceptance in question. We shall attempt to show
that this finding is not warranted by the evidence. Assuming, for
the present, that this is susceptible of demonstration, then there is
no difference between the facts of these two cases-except that in
]Varner vs. Lee, the note there in question was collected, and the
proceeds received by the defendant, before any formal notice was
gven to, him that the note was not the property of Smith & Co.;
while in the present case, the plaintiffs did not collect the acceptanceja question, and had formal notice before this suit was com;aenced, that it was the property of the defendants.
JIn Warner vs. Lee, the court said, that "When the defendant
•gceived 'this note he had notice, from its indorsement, from the
course of business of Smith & Co., with which he was acquainted,
.u dfrom the letter which enclosed the note to him, that itwas
,placerl ip his hands for;collection only, on account of the owners,
,fhe, plkintiffs in this suit." Under thesecircumstances, if he. had
* a qdvances upon account of it, he could not have held the note
-,9Xi4_proCeeds, against the plaintiffs. Clark vs. Merchants' Bank,

.,Qomat. 880.
,,,1 the present case, the plaintiff had the same notice, except
such as the indorsement furnished.. In Warner vs. Lee, the plainAffs indorsed the note in blank on delivering it to Smith & ,Co.,
.Vd they filled up the blank indorsement with the defendant's
'paule ; whereby it was, in form, specially indorsed by the plaintiffs
,,p,the, defendant. In the present case, the blank indorsement of
,the defendants was left as they wrote it, and Josiah Lee & Co.
,7rote under it a pecial indorsement by themselves to the plaintiffs, in terms stating it was for collection. The present plaintiffs
.ha4,notice, therefore, that Lee & Co. had received it for collection;
that they sent it for collection for the owners; and the natural
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inference would be that the payees were the owners, it being
indorsed only by them, and by Josiah Lee & Co. Arnold vs. Clark,
1 Sandf. S. C. R. 491, supports these views. If it be thought that
the decision in Warner vs. Lee conflicts with that in 1he Bank of
the Metropolis vs. The New England Bank, 1 How. U. S. 234, it
would, nevertheless, be our duty to follow it, it being the decision
of the court of last resort of this State, and controlling upon us.
The latter case was cited in Warner vs. Lee, 2 Seld. 146, and of
course was not overlooked.
In Clark vs. The Merchants' Bank, 2 Comst. 880, the court
treated the material and controlling question as being "twhether
the bill in question was transmitted to Smith & Co.; for collectioa
merely, or was to be credited to the plaintiffs when received by the
former, whether collected or not." Id. And to complete the
statement of the material elements entering into the questidn,
GARDINER, J., added: ",As the bill was indorsed in blank by the
plaintiffs, the legal title passed to Smith & Co., primd facie, and
the plaintiffs must establish the fact that it was indorsed and forwarded for the purpose of collection."
In the present case, the plaintiffs have proved by evidence which
is uncontradicted, that Miller, Cloud & Miller deposited the bill
with Josiah Lee & Co. for collection; that the latter indorsed it
specially to the present plaintiffs, and stated in the indorsement
itself that they indorsed it to the plaintiffs for collection, and that
the plaintiffs, on receiving it, entered it in their books as having
been received for collection, and by letter to Josiah Lee & Co.,
informed them that they had entered it for collection.
In Clark vs. The Merchants' Bank, supra, GARDINER, J., discusses the evidence therein, as to the classes of funds remitted,
and came to the conclusion that one class was remitted to be
credited as cash when received, and to be drawn against, whether
paid or not, at the time of so drawing; and that another class ws
remitted for collection, and was not to be credited or drawn against,
until actually paid.
As to the class which was to be credited as cash when received,
the Court held that the title passed to John T. Smith & Co., on
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their reception of the samej and that their application of the
proceeds to the payment of their own debt, could not be questioned
in a suit against creditors (of John T. Smith & Co.) receiving theut
in good faith.
The error of the Court below was stated to consist in the
assumption "that nothing went into account properly" until
collectedin the course of business (or in other words that nothing
was to b6 credited as cash when receive . Id. 385i GARDiNER,
J., summarily states the position of the parties, inter se, with
reference to the different classes of remittances, thus: cFor the
first class they were to be credited with- the right to' draw upon
their correspondents; as to the second and third the N. Y. firm
'were the agents of the plaintiffs, and had no other interest in and
control over the assets, than such as was necessary to the discharge
of their agency." Id. 385.
• In ' cott vs., The Ocean Bank, 5 Bosw. 192, and 23 N. Y. R.
289, the Court held, that,-1. The property in notes or bills transmitted to a banker'by'his
customer, to be credited the latter, Vests in the banker only when
he -has -become absolutely responsible for the' amount to" thd
: • ,",1
.
deositor. 1 '2. -'Such 'uobligation, previous torthecollection of The bill dan
only be establishd'by-a'contfact,to 'be expressly Prdved,- or
........
itfered from an unequivocal conrte'of dealing.
-,That case, in all of its material facts, bears - close resemblanb6
to the one befbre us. -And the 'Court sily: c When, therefore,, it
appears that the bill in question was retained in the possession of
the company' (the' party to "whom it was seht f6i collection), after
its .acceptance, and that no bredit had heen given for it at the
time, it -was passed to the defendants, and when nothing is'discl6sed in the whole course of dealings between the parties to 'how
'that any bill was evdr credited or agreed:to b6 erbdited in &'ccount
bbfbre its oollection, or that Eyell -(the'remitter) ever diew or wa
entitled to draw on the company, or that -it was" bound* to accept
drafts otherwisb than upon and for fuids-actually receivbd in cash,'
it -must be Vnderstood that the company at the time of the transfer
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stood in the relation of agents for its collection merely." In that
case, the defendants received the bill from the company to secure
a pre-existing indebtedness, and credited its proceeds to the company after it was paid; and they were held liable to the plaintiff
for its amount.
If, therefore, it is clear upon the evidence that the present
plaintiffs did not, and wore not under any obligation .to credit the
bill in question to Josiah Lee & Co. when received, and that there
was no agreement or understanding between them that remittances
for collection or a delay to draw for cash balances was to be based
upon or influenced by the consideration of holding paper sent for
collection and not matured, then it will follow that the judgment
in this case is in conflict with Warner vs. Zee and Scott vs. The
Ocean Bank, supra.
With reference to this question, it may be observed, first, that
the learned judge who tried this cause states in his opinion that
"the only ground upon which the plaintiffs' claim can rest, is a
mutual agreement between themselves and Josiah Lee & Co., that
all remittances, made by either to the other, should be considered
as made upon the faith of any"prior remittances by the latter to
the former, unless notice was given of the interest of others in tho
paper first remitted ;" and, 8econd, that the learned judge did not
find as a fact that any such agreement was ever made.
There is no evidence that any express agreement to that effect
was ever made. And we think it quite clear that no such agreement can be inferred from the course of dealing between those
parties.
Clharles B. Hoffman, one of the plaintiffs, testified as to the
course of dealing between his firm and Josiah Lee & Co. thus:
4 We remitted to them, and they to us; they kept an account with
us, and we with them; they drew upon us, and we upon them;
sent paper for collection and so on; their remittances to us, if at
sight, were collected at once and passed to their credit; the ,same
course was pursued with the paper we sdnt them." That the
question whether the plaintiffs "were entitled to draw as against
remittances for collection before their maturity," ,, never came
up ;" that they never did it nor had occasion to do it, and that he
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does not remembei that his firm ever drew " otherwise than against
balances" of collections actually aade.
The only circumstance furnishing any evidence of any exception
to this, as the uniform course of business, is in the testimony of
Mr. Hoffman, to the effect that he remembered "one-instance
when we (his firm) paid a large over-draft by them" (Josiah Lee
& Co.). .y over-draft, as here spoken of, we understand a draft
for a larger amount than the cash balance then standing .to the
credit of.Josiah Lee & Co. Mr. Hoffman testifies that neither
firm was " ever under obligation to pay anysuch draft," and, that
he thinks there were two or three instances of over-drafts by Josiah
Lee & Co.
In opposition to this exceptional transaction, and in support of
the understanding being in accordance with that indicated by the
usual and common course of their business, is the fact that bills on
time, when received, were entered in the books of the plaintiffs as
having been received for collection, and. were never otherwise
e€edited, until actually: collected ;,that the bill in question was
sent, entered, and by plaintiffs' letter. is admitted to have been
xrceived for, colectionj and- never was otherwise oredited,,to. Josiah

,Lee & Co.
A This.
E evidee.4 -doesnot n any, manner jastify.the finding of-such
an agreement, as the Court at special term held, it esseutial for the
.plo.intitfs tP establish n-order to r.cover; .nor does it. furnish'any
evidence of an- obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to Igive ,credit
to Josiah. Lee &,Co. for it until actually paid; or of any assent an
their part that it, or 9ther bills received under like circumstanced,
should be held by. the plaintiffs @s security for xemittances subsequently made by them, or for te paymentof any.cash.balamee.in
their favor that .might then happen to exist). or might subsequehtly
*aecrue,

~

A,.

~

.~

:r Under ouch.ciroumstAnces evidenceby-Mr. Holman ifthattwe
afbs
firm) always tookinto acoubtthe,.paper-that-wehad on hand,
.i remitting for fcollection orrra*ing .down-, our balaneeswith

,thenw gt least woe did -for-everal, mnoth,!' aholl-inot' be'allowed

HOFF31AN ET AL. vs. MILLER ET AL.

The answer imports, that this mental operation to which he testifies was of late occurrence and short duration; there is no pretence that it had been disclosed to Josiah Lee & Co., or was
authorized or suspected by them-and so long as it is essential to
a valid agreement that there should be- at least two parties to it;
evidence of what the plaintiffs " took into account or consideration," or "looked very closely and relied upon" in making remittances or delaying to draw cash balances, should be disregarded
when it is clear that it was unauthorized, and that Josiah Lee &
Co. had not the slightest reason to suspect anything of the kind.
We think, therefore, that no discrimination favorable to the
plaintiffs can be made between this case and Warner vs. Lee, and
Scott vs. The Ocean Bank, supra. That on the evidence it is
clear that the plaintiffs received the bill for collection, and knowing
that Josiah Lee & Co. received and forwarded to them for collection paper belonging to third persons, as well as paper owned by
themselves; that Lee & Co. were not entitled to be credited with
the bill until actually collected, and that there is no evidence justifying, the claim of a mutual agreement or. understanding that
remittances for collection by either were made on the faith and
security of paper in their hands, not matured and previously received for the like purpose, from the house to which such remittances were made.
We do not deem it material or useful to attempt to discriminate
between The Bank of the Metropolis vs. The N'"ew England Bank,
and Warner vs. Lee, or Scott vs. The Ocean Bank, suTra. If it
be supposed that no material difference exists, it is none the less
our duty to conform our decision tb the law, as declared by the
Court of dernier resort of this state.
It is not to be denied, however much it is to be regretted,
that there is an apparent conflict between the Courts of this and
other states, as to the circumstances sufficient to constitute an
indorser of paper a bond fide holder for value, so as to exclude the
equities of third persons, or defences that could be made in a suit
between the original. parties. Stalker vs. McDonald, 6 Hill 93;
Warner vs. Lee ; Scott vs. The Ocean Bank, 8upra; Swift vs. Ty-
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son, 16 Peters 1; Le Breton vs. Pierce, vol. 9, Am. L. R. 737,
and note thereto in vol. 1, Id. N. S. p. 35.
It may be observed, however, that the head note in Swift vs.
Tyson enunciates no rule in conflict with the decisions in this state.
and if the fact was proved in that case (as asserted in the argunent of Mr. _Ps8enden), viz. : "cthat on receiving the acceptance,
he (the plaintiff) had given up the note of Norton & Keith, which
had been endorsed by one Mhild," the decision is in harmony with
those of this State.
The learned author of the note upon Le Breton vs. Pierce, 1
Am. L. R. N. S. p. 38, states that " it has always seemed to us that
most of the controversy upon this subject has grown out of the
different sense in which the terms are understood. If the term
'collateral'is understood to import that the bills thus held are not
taken on account of the existing debt, but only to be held until due,
and if paid, the amount to be applied, and in the mean time the
creditor assumes no responsibility in regard to them, except as the
mere agent of the debtor for collection, there could be no ground of
claim that any property passed, or that existing equities in former
parties were extinguished."
In The Bank of the Metropolis vs. The Bank of New England4
supra, the Court says, "cThere does not, indeed, appear to be
any express agreement that those balances should not be immediately drawn for, but it may be implied, from the manner in which
the business was conducted; and if the accounts show that it was
their practice and understandingto allow them to stand and await
the collection of the paper remitted, the rights of the parties are
the same as if there had been- a positive and express agreement."
This seems to hold that either an express agreement, or one justly
inferrible from competent evidence, of the actual understanding
of the parties, of the character stated, would make a holder of
bills, received under that agreement, a. holder for value to the
extent of any balance due to him.
This may be .conceded to be law, and yet, if we have taken a
correct view of the evidence in the present case, and of its legal
effect, the plaintiffs haye failed to bring themselves within this

